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ABSTRACT
During high-stakes or high-threat situations, decisions must be made very quickly.
Certain situational and individual difference factors can have an impact on decisionmaking under threat. In terms of situational effects, prior research demonstrates that
threats that are perceived as farther away may allow for behavioral inhibition. Moreover,
individual differences, such as low trait neuroticism and effective coping strategies, may
play a mitigating role in the experience of threat, thereby increasing the likelihood of
responding adaptively to the situation instead of being reactive. Consequently, the
purpose of this study was to examine whether specific factors, including situational
reappraisal, changes in target distance, and individual differences in coping and trait
neuroticism, influence action-based decision-making in high-threat situations. Actionbased decision-making under threat was assessed through the decision to shoot or not
shoot a target based on whether or not it was armed. An opportunity for reappraisal was
presented with the target changing or staying the same distance. Individual differences
examined included neuroticism and coping strategies. The opportunity for reappraisal did
not increase decision accuracy. However, reappraisal as a coping strategy was useful in
decision accuracy. Increasing the distance of the target during reappraisal also was useful
in decision accuracy. Neuroticism, on the other hand, was not a significant predictor of
performance. The results from this study may have implications regarding the usefulness
of coping strategies in aiding decision-making under high-stakes situations versus the
influence of ingrained individual characteristics and the opportunity for reappraisal.
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INTRODUCTION
Section 1: Overview
Certain occupations require quick life and death decisions. This type of decision
is pertinent to, for example, members of law enforcement and the military who have to
decide whether or not to use lethal force on another human being. Unfortunately, making
this decision is very difficult and has resulted in many situations where an unarmed
person or non-enemy was killed. Threat perception is crucial to such situations. In order
to decide whether or not to shoot, an individual has to appraise the situation and decide
whether or not a threat is truly present. This study examines how action-based decisionmaking is affected by appraisal, re-evaluation of the situation, and psychological factors
during threat.

Section 2: Emotion’s Effects on Perception
Initial appraisal, re-evaluation, and subsequent decision-making are influenced by
changes in perception caused by psychological state. An abundance of research suggests
that emotion can influence one's perception. According to the circumplex model,
emotions can be understood as falling within the polarized dimensions of arousal (high to
low) and valence (pleasure-displeasure) as degrees on a circle (Russell, 1980). Positive
valence is associated with increased perception of a situation as an opportunity, rather
than a danger (Tamir & Robinson, 2007). Negative valence stimuli are perceived as
larger than positive or neutral stimuli (van Ulzen, Semin, Oudejans, & Beek, 2008).
These effects can be explained, in part, by the affect-as-information hypothesis, which
proposes that emotion can convey motivating information about a situation (Schwarz &
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Clore, 1983). Such information includes potential costs and benefits of taking action,
which can prompt rapid, automatic responses without thoughtfully considering the
consequences of such actions (Hogarth et al., 2011). Thus, the effect of emotion on
perception can be adaptive by motivating efficient actions and minimizing potentially
dangerous actions. For example, negative valence and high arousal states such as feeling
threatened are associated with increased risk perception (Hogarth et al., 2011) which may
motivate the individual to react in a way to minimize the risk of harm. Feeling threatened
can also influence the perception of a stimulus’ characteristics. According to the threatsignal hypothesis, a threatening stimulus tends to be misperceived as being closer in
proximity than a nonthreatening stimulus. For example, feeling threatened by the
presence of a tarantula makes it seem closer (Cole, Balcetis, & Dunning, 2013).
Similarly, stimuli that are perceived as threatening appear to move faster (Witt &
Sugovic, 2013). Consequently, perceiving a stimulus as moving faster or being closer
may prompt a response that would minimize the opportunity for the stimulus to cause
harm.
When an individual encounters a stimulus, his or her reaction to it determines how
he or she understands a situation. Both valence and arousal can affect one’s perception of
a situation. For example, negative valence can lead to the perception of a stimulus as
producing costs to the perceiver, while positive valence can lead the perceiver to have a
more beneficent perception of a stimulus. In addition, high arousal combined with
negative valence can cause an individual to focus on risks in a situation. In particular, one
negative emotion, fear, has a profound effect on perception; if an individual is feeling
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fearful, then he or she may tend to perceive a stimulus as more threatening relative to
individuals who are not feeling fearful. Consequently, previous research collectively
suggests that threatening stimuli often elicit high arousal, negative valence emotions,
such as fear. These emotions, in turn, can lead an individual to perceive a stimulus in a
way that increases the sense of threat. As a result, the individual may react negatively
towards the stimulus in order to protect himself or herself from potential harm; this
reaction will be maladaptive if the stimulus is innocuous.

Section 3: The Effect of Threat Perception on Decision-Making and
Inhibitory Control
The impact of emotion on threat perception can influence the action chosen by an
individual. A decision can be made using both emotion and evaluation of risk. According
to the risk-as-feelings hypothesis, both emotional reactions and expected utility (EU)
theory—the theory that an option’s utility is determined by the expected outcome value
and the likelihood of that outcome occurring (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979)— are used
when making a risky decision (Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, & Welch, 2001). However,
there can be a stronger influence from an emotional reaction. For instance, when an
emotion and cognitive evaluation contradict each other, more weight is given to emotion
in making a decision. An emotional reaction to a potential risk can also occur without the
presence of cognitive evaluation, further demonstrating the potency of emotion in risky
decision-making (Loewenstein et al., 2001). The risk-as-feelings hypothesis demonstrates
that decision-making is not just a cognitive process; emotion is a strong determining
factor. When faced with making a decision during a threatening situation, in addition to

3

emotional influence, the choice with a preferred outcome and high degree of certainty
may be chosen in order to minimize risk of injury.
Another means that a decision can be made is through the ability and tendency to
perceive a threat. According to signal detection theory (SDT; Green & Swets, 1966)
behavior can be described in terms of sensitivity (the ability to perceive differences
between targets and non-targets) and bias (the tendency to perceive stimuli as targets).
There are four possible decisions: correct detections, correct rejections, missed
detections, and false alarms. The former two decisions provide benefit to the perceiver
while the latter two are detrimental (Lynn & Barrett, 2014). Thus, what is important to
decision-making in threatening circumstances is how easy it is to perceive aspects of a
stimulus that indicate it is a true threat and whether there is a tendency to perceive threat
or lack of threat in a situation.
While decision-making is the process of choosing between options, judgement
involves determining the likelihood of an event occurring (Blanchette & Richards, 2010).
In addition to influencing decision-making, emotion also influences one’s judgment.
Being exposed to a stimulus inducing negative affect, such as anxiety, leads to estimating
negative events as occurring more frequently (Constans, 2001; Johnson and Tversky,
1983). Likewise, being sensitive to cues regarding punishment instead of reward in one's
environment is associated with a higher prediction of the occurrence of negative events
(Zelenski & Larsen, 2002). Judging the likelihood of negative events influences decisionmaking. For instance, people are less willing to take a risk when loss has a low
probability, and more willing when there is a low probability for gain (Tversky &
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Kahneman, 1992). Similar to judgment, threat has an influence on risk-based decisionmaking. Experiencing high threat can lead to risk aversion, with individuals being less
likely to prefer a choice with a high probability of a small gain and small probability of a
large loss regardless of state anxiety level. (Matthews, Panganiban, & Hudlicka, 2011).
Thus, when a decision must be made about whether or not to engage in an action while
under significant threat, the option that avoids a large loss may be chosen.
Critically, action-based decisions, including those involving risk, are guided by
both decision-making and the inhibition of inappropriate responses. Thus, it is important
to understand how threat influences both decision-making and inhibitory control.
Previous research demonstrates that threat exposure can reduce response inhibition
performance (Hartikainen, Siiskonen, & Ogawa, 2012; Pessoa, Padmala, Kenzer, &
Bauer, 2012). This exposure would naturally lead to the experience of the negative, high
arousal state of feeling threatened. However, arousal has more of an influence on
response inhibition than valence of the threat itself (Pessoa et al., 2012). Thus, an
individual experiencing high physiological arousal under a threatening situation is more
likely to respond defensively. On the other hand, if the individual regulates his or her
physiological response so as to experience less arousal, the individual may have more
control over his or her conditioned response to the threat.

Section 4: Theoretical Background
As has been demonstrated, there can be different responses to a threat stimulus. A
threatening stimulus is but one of the many types of stimuli that an individual can react
to. There are three behavioral reactions that can be directed towards a stimulus: approach,
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fight-flight-freeze, and behavioral inhibition. The reaction will vary based on individual
assessment of a stimulus, environment, and situation (Corr, 2013). To understand this
reaction, it is crucial to distinguish between approach and avoidance. Approach involves
directing one's energy towards a positive stimulus, while avoidance involves directing
one's energy away from a negative stimulus (Elliot, 2006).
The way in which individuals evaluate stimuli as either positive or negative guides
(1) the decision to approach or avoid the stimulus and (2) the speed at which this decision
is made (Elliot & Covington, 2001). For example, when a threatening (i.e., negative,
high arousal) stimulus is perceived as imminent, the fight-flight-freeze system is
activated, and evaluations are made quickly. However, if the threat is perceived as far
away, behavioral inhibition can be used, and cognitive processing is controlled.
Behavioral inhibition in this situation allows the individual to approach a stimulus
carefully (Corr, 2013). In contrast, being under imminent threat can cause an individual
to approach an object faster (Arnaudova, Krypotos, Effting, Kindt, & Beckers, 2017).
These behavioral tendencies demonstrate that the characteristics of a threat determines
how a stimulus is processed and in turn the behavior of an individual towards that
stimulus.
With the presence of potential threats in the environment it is important for an
individual to know how and when to protect himself or herself. According to protection
motivation theory, an individual is motivated to protect himself or herself after perceiving
a threat that could result in an unfavorable outcome (Floyd, Prentice‐Dunn, & Rogers,
2000). SDT relates to this theory in that the level of sensitivity and bias influence whether
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a stimulus is assessed as a threat. Determining that a stimulus is a threat constitutes either
a correct detection or false alarm depending on whether the stimulus is truly noxious.
Furthermore, the determination of noxiousness can be influenced by familiarity. Being
familiar with a scenario can lead to the assessment of the severity and likelihood of the
occurrence of a noxious event (Rogers, 1975). A stimulus’ level of noxiousness,
probability of occurring, and an individual’s coping response efficacy are appraised in an
encounter. If the stimulus is very noxious, likely to occur, and there is an opportunity to
cope, protection motivation will be activated (Rogers, 1975). However, according to
SDT, false alarms are a possibility. Thus, it is possible that protection motivation will be
activated in the presence of an innocuous stimulus. In contrast, there are also times when
protection motivation is not activated in a potentially threatening situation. The decision
to protect oneself is less likely when reward for not protecting is high and there are costs
to protecting oneself (Floyd et al., 2000). Thus, an individual must decide if the benefits
outweigh the costs in acting defensively.
One way that individuals can weigh these costs and benefits is through cognitive
appraisal, or the process of interpreting an emotional situation and one’s reaction to it.
This appraisal is guided by one’s perception of a stimulus as either threatening or
innocuous as well as one’s ability to cope with the situation (Smith & Lazarus, 1990).
This evaluation guides how an individual responds to a situation. For instance, if coping
is effective, then a change in appraisal will occur that will result in a more positive
emotion. However, if coping is ineffective, then a more negative emotion will occur
(Smith & Lazarus, 1990). Thus, in situations in which a stimulus is appraised as a threat
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and an individual believes that he or she can cope effectively, the individual is likely to
respond adaptively toward the stimulus to effectively minimize the threat. In contrast,
when an individual does not believe that he or she can cope effectively with such a threat,
then a maladaptive, reactive behavior is likely to occur.
Although emotion can influence actions, one’s actions can often be suppressed as
a means of coping (Smith & Lazarus, 1990). Another means of coping, emotion-focused,
can involve a change in emotion with or without changing the meaning of an event
(Smith & Lazarus, 1990). Thus, when faced with a potential threat, an individual can alter
his or her feelings towards the stimulus, possibly by re-evaluating the original assessment
of the stimulus as threatening. This re-evaluation may enhance the likelihood that an
individual will respond adaptively to mitigate a threat.

Section 5: Reappraisal
The adaptiveness of re-evaluation demonstrates that appraisal involves balancing
the desire to view situations realistically and to view them positively. The desire to view
situations positively may involve the reinterpretation of the meaning of a stimulus, which
is known as reappraisal (Lazarus, 2001). During reappraisal, altered physiological and
cognitive responses are used to cope with a stressful event (Jamieson, Mendes, & Nock,
2013). However, there are limits to somatic regulation as there is evidence that
reappraisal of a disturbing stimulus leads to the same physiological response as
experiencing the stimulus without attempts to engage in coping strategies (Gross, 1998).
Thus, when faced with a threat, an individual can work to consciously reinterpret the
situation in order to feel less distressed. However, it is possible that if the situation is
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extremely threatening, the individual will still experience a negative physiological
reaction, making reappraisal unsuccessful.
When it comes to stress-inducing stimuli, an important distinction should be made
between challenge and threat. Threat is a reaction to damage that might possibly occur,
while challenge is a positive experience involving facing obstacles (Lazarus, 2001).
Logically, it follows that threat appraisal focuses on potential loss, while challenge
appraisal focuses on potential gain (Anshel, Robertson, & Caputi, 1997). Both threat and
challenge involve uncertainty because they involve a focus on the future (Lazarus, 2001).
However, appraising a situation as threatening is related to perceived lack of control,
while appraising a situation as a challenge is associated with perceiving the situation as
controllable (Anshel et al., 1997). Furthermore, according to the biopsychosocial model
of challenge and threat, challenge occurs when situational demands do not exceed
perceived resources, while threat occurs when these demands exceed perceived resources
(Jamieson et al., 2013). Based on this model, whether an intimidating situation is judged
as a true threat is determined by an individual’s ability to cope. Coping ability in turn will
determine the action taken to respond to the encountered situation as either a threat or
non-threat.
Reappraising a situation can lead to viewing it positively, whether it is perceived
as a threat or a challenge (Anshel et al., 1997). Consequently, reappraisal can lead to
reductions in negative affect. This reduction in negative affect, including fear, can lead to
an increase in risk taking (Heilman, Crişan, Houser, Miclea, & Miu, 2010). This increase
is due to reappraisal’s association with perceiving a situation as controllable and
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increased confidence (Anshel et al., 1997; Jamieson, Mendes, Blackstock, & Schmader,
2010). Thus, if someone is faced with making an urgent decision while under threat,
reappraising the situation can lead to the selection of a choice of action that is riskier than
the one the individual would select acting solely on fear.

Section 6: Influences on Shooting Behavior
The risk taking associated with reappraisal is relevant for certain occupations that
involve decision-making under threat. For example, law enforcement and military
personnel must often make a decision regarding whether or not to discharge a firearm.
Being in a stressful, high-threat situation can make a shooter discriminate less accurately
between a friendly and enemy target (Gamble et al., 2018). Moreover, the decision of
whether to shoot a person in a threatening situation involves a rewarding versus
unpleasant result. For instance, not shooting an armed individual would lead to the
unpleasant result of injury to or death of the police officer or soldier, while shooting an
armed individual would lead to the rewarding result of preserving one’s own life and
potentially even protecting others. In the case of an unarmed person, shooting would lead
to an unpleasant result, while not shooting would lead to the rewarding result of
preserving an innocent civilian’s life. Recent research demonstrates that when the most
rewarding choice is associated with imminent threat, individuals tend to avoid that choice
and instead choose an option that is less rewarding (Bublatzky, Alpers, & Pittig, 2017).
When this threat is no longer imminent, however, the option with a higher probability of
reward is favored (Bublatzky et al., 2017). Thus, if a police officer or soldier approaches
a situation with the intention not to shoot an individual if they are unarmed (most
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rewarding choice), but the ambiguity of the situation or characteristics of the individual
causes an imminent sense of threat, he or she may choose to discharge a firearm.
However, if after a period of time the police officer or soldier continues to interact with
the potentially dangerous individual and no harm occurs, then he or she may likely not
shoot.
The decision to shoot a target is greatly influenced by perception of threat level.
The reaction to threat can be framed as approach (shooting) and avoidance (not shooting).
When threatened, individuals are faster to approach a stimulus. In contrast, they are faster
to avoid a stimulus if there is no threat present (Arnaudova et al., 2017). Thus, shooting
an armed target occurs faster while under high threat compared to low threat
(Nieuwenhuys, Savelsbergh, & Oudejans, 2015). Additionally, a study that evaluated
how police officers perceive different sources of information as important or unimportant
factors in deciding whether or not to use deadly force showed that police officers take
very limited information into account when making this decision. The information that
was considered most important included the presence of a suspect’s weapon, physical
distance from the suspect (closer distance increased the likelihood of using deadly force),
the presence of bystanders, and availability of backup (Hayden, 1981). Thus, the
evaluation of threat level according to characteristics of an encounter (e.g. the presence of
a gun) is crucial in determining whether to use lethal force and the speed at which this
decision is made.
In addition to characteristics of the situation, characteristics of the individual
being targeted can affect the behavior of the shooter. For instance, Blacks tend to be
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mentally processed as more threatening than Whites, especially if the individual making
the assessment holds or is aware of negative stereotypes about Blacks (Correll, Urland, &
Ito, 2006). Thus, there is a shooter bias of being more likely and faster to shoot armed
targets when they are Black, and less likely and slower to shoot unarmed targets when
they are White (Correll, Park, Judd, & Wittenbrink, 2002; Akinola & Mendes, 2012).
Based on these findings, Blacks are seen as more threatening than Whites and are thus
more likely to be shot in a confrontation involving a firearm. Thus, it is important to
include both Black and White targets in the research design.
In addition to the qualities of the individual being targeted, certain qualities of the
shooter may also matter in high-threat or deadly force situations. Research is very limited
on the effects of individual factors on police shootings (Donner, Maskaly, Piquero, &
Jennings, 2017). However, in terms of the Big Five personality traits, neuroticism shows
a positive relationship with fear and perceived threat intensity (Craske et al., 2009;
Hengartner, van der Linden, Bohleber, & von Wyl, 2017; Perkins, Cooper, Abdelall,
Smillie, & Corr, 2010). Furthermore, neuroticism is also associated with negative coping
(Hengartner et al., 2017). Consequently, being high in neuroticism may be associated
with an increased likelihood of perceiving a target as threatening and taking inappropriate
action, such as shooting an unarmed target. As mentioned previously, emotions can be
regulated as a means of coping and this regulation also occurs during reappraisal. Thus,
an investigation into how individual differences in coping strategies impact decisionmaking during high-threat situations is important to examine.
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Individual differences in biological sex and working memory capacity may also
impact action-based decision-making under threat. For example, previous work shows
that increasing the number of female police officers has been shown to reduce shootings,
as being male is positively correlated with involvement in shootings (Donner et al.,
2017). Furthermore, those with higher working memory capacity (WMC) have better
judgment on whether to shoot; individuals with lower WMC are more likely to shoot an
unarmed target and less likely to shoot an armed target (Brewer, Hunter Ball, & Ware,
2016; Kleider & Parrott, 2009; Kleider, Parrott, & King, 2010). Seemingly, having more
cognitive resources acts as a mitigating factor of erroneous shooting behavior when under
threat. Consequently, biological sex and WMC will be included as covariates in this
present research.

Section 7: Study Overview
One possible way to reduce shooting errors may be reappraisal; reassessing a
target as threatening or nonthreatening in a confrontation may change whether or not an
individual decides to shoot. However, the research on rapid reappraisal in shooting
situations is limited. Additionally, individual difference factors may influence both how a
threat is perceived initially and how it is perceived after reappraisal. For instance,
research would suggest that being high in neuroticism would be associated with being
more likely to shoot an unarmed target, due to experiencing a higher threat intensity than
would be experienced by someone lower in neuroticism. To examine the impacts of
reappraisal along with individual factors on action-based decision-making, a “shoot-don’t
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shoot” task was performed. Individuals were required within a short period of time to
decide whether or not a target was a threat or innocuous under a state of ambiguity.
This present research investigates how various factors affect the decision of what
action to take. The exploratory investigation of personality variables provides insight into
how individual differences affect decisions under high-stakes situations. The behavior of
the target is also important in decision-making. Whether the target moves closer, farther
away, or stays the same distance after initial appraisal may determine an individual’s
reaction to it, as change in distance is related to an individual’s threat perception. To
examine these factors, participants were presented with targets to which they had to
respond rapidly with the decision to shoot or not shoot. In addition to the initial
evaluation, participants also had to decide what action to take after the same target
reappeared either changed or unchanged (through distance).
Replicating previous research (Correll et al., 2002), it is predicted that accuracy
will be lowest for Black targets holding non-weapon items (Hypothesis 1a), and
participants will be less accurate when the target is holding a gun relative to when the
target is holding a non-weapon (Hypothesis 1b) in the standard phase. Participants will
respond faster when a target is armed (Hypothesis 2a), and participants will shoot an
armed target faster if he is Black (Hypothesis 2b) in the standard phase. Additionally,
after an opportunity for situational reappraisal, individuals will be less likely to shoot an
unarmed target compared to situations where there is no opportunity for reappraisal, due
to the individuals evaluating the situation as less threatening. Taking the time to
reappraise the situation will lead individuals to perceive that there is no immediate threat
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(Hypothesis 3). When the target is farther away, the individual will be less accurate in
shooting an unarmed target due to the activation of the fight-flight-freeze response. In
comparison when the target moves farther away, the individual will be less likely to shoot
an unarmed target due to him or her being more inhibited and taking more time to
evaluate the situation (Hypothesis 4). Having the opportunity to reappraise the situation
will result in a change in decision if the target moves closer or farther away (Hypothesis
5a). Participants will be more likely to have the same response during reappraisal when a
target holding a weapon moves closer (Hypothesis 5b). In addition to characteristics of
the target influencing decision, the influence of shooter characteristics (i.e. individual
differences) will also be examined. The relationships between the decision to shoot or not
shoot and the individual characteristics explored in our hypotheses are exploratory, as the
literature does not cover these relations. One such individual difference is coping
strategy. The two coping strategies that will be focused on in this study are suppression—
which consists of an emotional response being inhibited— and reappraisal, which
involves framing a situation in a way that causes a change in emotional experience (Gross
& John, 2003). Our prediction is that individuals with higher coping skills (using
reappraisal more than suppression as a strategy) will make less errors and be more likely
to choose the non-lethal course of action when a target is unarmed, while those with
lower coping skills (using reappraisal less than suppression as a strategy) will be more
likely to shoot unarmed targets (Hypothesis 6a). Another individual difference examined
for effects on shooting performance is the personality trait neuroticism. Based on the
relationship threat perception and coping capacity have with neuroticism, it is predicted
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individuals high in neuroticism will have lower accuracy and be more likely to shoot
unarmed targets regardless of race (Hypothesis 6b). Furthermore, being high in coping
skills will be associated with a tendency to keep responses the same (Hypothesis 7a),
while being high in neuroticism will be associated with making different responses
during the reappraisal period (Hypothesis 7b).

METHOD
Participants
An a priori power analysis was performed using G*Power 3.1. Results indicated
that to have 80% power to detect a medium effect size (f2 = .15) with an alpha level of
.05, a minimum of 114 total participants would be needed. Participants were Clemson
University undergraduate students at least 18 years of age who participated in the study
for class credit through an online registration system, SONA. There were 141 participants
(111 females, 30 males; mean age = 18.76 ± 1.26). Two participants’ survey data were
excluded due to technological errors; thus, the final sample for the primary analyses was
139. Of the final sample, eight participants identified as Asian/Pacific Islander, eight as
Black, 113 as White, four as Hispanic/Latino, and six as more than one race.

Materials
Demographics. Information was collected regarding participant age, biological
sex, ethnicity, and family socioeconomic status. In addition to these sociological factors,
information on handedness and familiarity with guns was also collected.
Action-Based Decision-Making Task. To operationalize a high-threat situation,
an action-based decision-making task that is a modified version of a well-established
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experimental task known as the First-Person Shooting Task (FPST; Correll, et al., 2002)
was used. The FPST consists of trials displaying an image of a young man in different
poses against various outdoor public scene backgrounds, such as parks, city sidewalks, or
transportation terminals. In the present study, there were two different trial types: the
standard FPST trial types and reappraisal trial types. All participants completed both trial
types (one block of standard trials followed by a second block of reappraisal trials), thus
the study consisted of a within-subjects design. On all trials, half of the men were White
and half were Black and were shown holding either a gun or a harmless object. As there
were four different possible pairings between race of the target and object type (White
target/gun, White target/harmless object, Black target/gun, Black target/harmless object),
each combination made up one quarter of the response trials. The harmless objects were
either a soda can, a cell phone, or a wallet. The presentation of these items during the
harmless object trials was random.
During all trials of the task, participants viewed several backgrounds that were
displayed for 500 ms – 1000 ms (time duration was randomized for each trial). On some
of the backgrounds, a target (White or Black man) appeared. On the standard one-step
FPST trials, when the target appeared, participants had to decide within 630 ms whether
or not the object was a gun and how to react. This design served to prevent participants
from knowing where or when a target would appear or when exactly to make a response.
Participants were told that the men with guns were the “bad guys” and the men without
guns were the “good guys”, and that they should shoot the bad guys and help the good
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guys. If the object the target was holding was a gun one key was pressed to “shoot”; if
the object was harmless another key was pressed to “help”.
On standard one-step FPST trials, participants simply decided whether to shoot or
help and then received feedback on whether the decision was correct. A sample trial with
an image taken from Correll, Hudson, Guillermo, & Ma (2014) is shown in Figure 1. A
practice demonstration of these trial types can be found at
http://psych.colorado.edu/~jclab/FPST/demo/canvas/ testPrograms/st_v.1.html. On
reappraisal trials, participants were told that the task has changed because they had
entered new territory and that it now consisted of two steps. In the first step, they should
respond as they did in the first phase of trials by deciding whether to shoot or help the
target based on whether or not the target is holding a gun. No feedback would be given
on performance accuracy during this first step. As part of the second step, the same target
would appear again either coming closer, moving farther away, or remaining the same
distance as it was the first time it appeared. If the target moved closer the participant
should shoot; if the target moved farther away the participant should help him. If the
target stayed in the same position, participants should respond as they did in the first step
by shooting if the target had a gun or helping if the target did not have a gun. Thus,
participants had to reappraise the threat level of the target to respond correctly. Correct
responses on the second step followed the same feedback procedure as the standard FPST
one-step trials (points for correct responses; penalties for incorrect responses). A sample
trial is shown in Figure 2 with an image taken from Correll et al. (2014).
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Task feedback took the form of a point system with points being gained for a
correct decision and deducted for an incorrect decision. Hits (shooting an armed target)
were worth 10 points and correct rejections (helping an unarmed target) were worth 5
points. False alarms (shooting an unarmed target) led to a loss of 20 points, while misses
(helping an armed target) led to a loss of 40 points. Not responding within the allotted
time led to a deduction of 25 points. Good performance was monetarily incentivized;
after completing the task, participants received $1 for every 100 points with a maximum
of $10 being offered.

Figure 1. Sample of a FPST trial for the one-step standard condition of the action-based
decision-making task.
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You subdued a
shooter!
You earned 10
Figure 2. Sample of a trial for the two-step reappraisal condition of the action-based
decision-making task.
points
Familiarity with Guns. The familiarity with guns questionnaire used a five-point
Likert scale from strongly disagree to strongly agree. The questions were as follows: 1) I
am a gun owner. 2) I would be able to use a gun safely and accurately. 3) I play firstperson shooter video games.
Coping Strategies. The Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (ERQ; Gross & John,
2003) was used to assess coping strategy. It consists of Reappraisal and Suppression
subscales with items on a 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 7 (Strongly Agree) scale. Having a score
higher in Reappraisal is equivalent to having higher coping skills.
Big Five Personality. The Big Five Inventory (BFI; John, Donahue, & Kentle,
1991) which measures five dimesions of personality, was used to assess level of
neuroticism with items on a 1 (Disagree Strongly) to 5 (Agree Strongly) scale. Higher
scores reflect greater degrees of neuroticism.
Working Memory Capacity (WMC). The Operation Span Test (OSPAN; Turner
& Engle, 1989) is a task that was used to assess WMC. In the OSPAN, a math problem
was displayed for two seconds after which a number appeared. The participant had to
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decide whether or not the number answered the math problem by responding “true” or
“false”. After a response was given a letter appeared. After each set of trials ranging from
three to seven math problem-letter sets, participants had to recall the letters in order. There
were 75 trials in total. The average number of letters correctly recalled in order for each set
were calculated to get the average letter span.

Procedure
After giving informed consent, participants were led to a computer. First, they
completed a demographics survey, as well as questions about handedness and familiarity
with guns. Afterwards, they completed the BFI and ERQ. The participants then
completed the OSPAN. Subsequently, participants completed the standard phase of the
action-based decision-making task followed by the reappraisal phase. In the standard
phase, they were instructed that their task is to shoot any person holding a gun by
pressing the “L” key and to press the “A” key if a person is holding something besides a
gun. In the reappraisal phase, they were told that on some trials, the person may change
position and they may have to respond again based on the person’s new position—
pressing the “L” key if the target approaches or the “A” key if the target moves farther
away. All participants were informed in the instructions that they had less than one
second to make a decision on each trial and that they would receive points based on their
performance, which would be converted to a cash bonus at the end of the study.
Participants completed 10 practice trials (five standard one-step FPST trials and five twostep reappraisal trials). After the practice trials, participants began the task. There were 80
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one-step trials and 80 two-step trials. All participants were paid according to their
performance and debriefed at the end of the study.

RESULTS
Descriptives
Descriptive statistics were performed on the predictor variables: Neuroticism,
Reappraisal, and Suppression. On the BFI participants’ Neuroticism scores ranged from
10 to 38 (M = 24.30, SD = 6.62). On the ERQ Reappraisal scores ranged from 18 to 42
(M = 32.09, SD = 5.38) and Suppression scores ranged from 4 to 27 (M = 14.57, SD =
6.02). Outlier values that were more than 2.5 standard deviations above or below the
mean of the outcome variables were removed. Three outliers were removed from the
outcome variable Accuracy Rate of the standard trials, and two from Accuracy Rate of
the reappraisal trials.
Pearson’s correlations were conducted between the outcome variables, predictors,
and covariates. The correlations are shown in Table 1 below. The ability to use a gun
safely (r(134) = .182, p = .03) and OSPAN score (r(134) = -.182, p = .03) significantly
correlated with accuracy during the reappraisal trials. These covariates, however, did not
significantly predict the other outcome variables. Being a gun owner, having experience
with first-person shooters, Neuroticism, Reappraisal, and Suppression did not correlate
significantly with any of the outcome variables. Independent samples t-tests were
conducted to determine the relationship between biological sex and the outcome
variables. All t-tests were nonsignificant, indicating a lack of relationship between
biological sex and the outcome variables: accuracy rate of the standard trials (t(136) = -
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.859, p = .392), accuracy rate of the reappraisal trials (t(137) = .280, p = .780), and the
difference in accuracy rate between the standard and reappraisal trials (t(139) = -.309, p
= .757). One-way ANOVAs were conducted to determine the relationship between
handedness (left-handed, right-handed, and ambidextrous) and the outcome variables.
The between-subjects results were nonsignificant, indicating a lack of relationship
between handedness and the outcome variables: accuracy rate of the standard trials (F(2,
133) = .734, p = .482), accuracy rate of the reappraisal trials (F(2, 134) = .635, p =
.531), and the difference in accuracy rate between the standard and reappraisal trials(F(2,
136) = .080, p = .923).
Table 1
Correlations of Covariates and Predictors with Accuracy Rate During Standard and
Reappraisal Trials
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
1. GunSafe
2. GunOwner
.585**
3. FPS Exp
.304**
.146
4. OSPAN
-.028
-.091
-.060
5. Big5N
-.164
-.145
-.045
-.136
6. Reappraisal
.031
.089
-.112
.128
-.238**
7. Suppression
.054
.135
.153
-.141
.101
-.016
8. AccStand
.080
-.007
.072
.089
.011
.001 -.024
9. AccReapp
-.033
.012
-.049
.084
-.003
.046
-.026
.419**
Note. GunSafe = ability to use a gun safely and accurately in an emergency situation; GunOwner = being a
gun owner; FPS Exp = first-person shooter video game experience; OSPAN = Operation Span Test; Big5N
= Neuroticism; AccStand = accuracy rate during standard trial; AccReapp = accuracy rate during
reappraisal trials.
*p < .05
**p < .01

Hierarchical Regressions
Overview. Seven two-step hierarchal regressions were conducted on the data to
predict the outcome variables. For each regression, the covariates entered into the first
step of the regression were Handedness, Biological Sex, and OSPAN scores. The
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predictors entered into the second step were Neuroticism, Suppression, and Reappraisal.
The outcome variables were accuracy rate for the standard trials, accuracy rate for the
reappraisal trials, and the difference in accuracy rate between the standard and reappraisal
trials, average reaction time for the standard trials, average reaction time for step one of
the reappraisal trials, average reaction time for step two of the reappraisal trials, and the
difference in average reaction time between the two steps in the reappraisal trials.
Hypotheses 6a (involving Reappraisal and Suppression) and 6b (involving Neuroticism)
are addressed in the analyses involving accuracy rate.
Accuracy rate for standard trials. The omnibus prediction at the first step was
nonsignificant, R2 = .016, F(3, 132) = .695, p = .557. OSPAN (β = .104, p = .230),
Handedness (β =.004, p = .964), and Biological Sex (β = .069, p = .429) were all
nonsignificant in predicting accuracy at this step. The omnibus prediction at the second
step was nonsignificant, DR2 = .003, F(6, 129) = .398, p = .879. Neuroticism (β = .048, p
= .609), Reappraisal (β = -.002, p = .978), and Suppression (β = -.028, p = .755) were all
nonsignificant in predicting accuracy at this step. Thus, neither Hypothesis 6a nor 6b are
supported.
Accuracy rate for reappraisal trials. The omnibus prediction at the first step
was nonsignificant, R2 = .009, F(3, 133) = .381, p = .767. OSPAN (β = .085, p = .324),
Handedness (β = -.019, p = .825), Biological Sex (β = -.032, p = .715) were all
nonsignificant in predicting accuracy at this step. The omnibus prediction at the second
step was nonsignificant, DR2 = .002, F(6, 130) = .222, p = .969. Neuroticism (β = .010, p
= .920), Reappraisal (β = .041, p = .654), and Suppression (β = -.011, p = .904) were all
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nonsignificant in predicting accuracy at this step. Thus, neither Hypothesis 6a nor 6b are
supported.
Difference in accuracy rate between the standard and reappraisal trials. The
omnibus prediction at the first step was nonsignificant, R2 = .001, F(3, 135) = .047, p =
.987. OSPAN (β = -.019, p = .825), Handedness (β = .005, p = .956), and Biological Sex
(β = .026, p = .765) were all nonsignificant in predicting accuracy at this step. The
omnibus prediction at the second step was nonsignificant, DR2 = .010, F(6, 132) = .254, p
= .957. Neuroticism (β = .055, p = .558), Reappraisal (β = -.034, p = .707), and
Suppression (β = .071, p = .430) were all nonsignificant in predicting accuracy at this
step.
Average reaction time for standard trials. The omnibus prediction at the first
step was nonsignificant, R2 = .020, F(3, 135) = .935, p = .426. OSPAN (β = -.046, p =
.592), Handedness (β = -.001, p = .991), and Biological Sex (β = -.135, p = .115) were all
nonsignificant in predicting average reaction time at this step. The omnibus prediction at
the second step was nonsignificant, DR2 = .006, F(6, 132) = .590, p = .738. Neuroticism
(β = .065, p = .485), Reappraisal (β = .061, p = .498), and Suppression (β = -.015, p =
.867) were all nonsignificant in predicting average reaction time at this step.
Average reaction time for reappraisal trials (step one). The omnibus
prediction at the first step was nonsignificant, R2 = .026, F(3, 135) = 1.181, p = .319.
OSPAN (β = -.103, p = .228), Handedness (β = .088, p = .305), and Biological Sex (β = .083, p = .328) were all nonsignificant in predicting average reaction time at this step.
The omnibus prediction at the second step was nonsignificant, DR2 = .011, F(6, 132) =
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.825, p = .552. Neuroticism (β = .108, p = .244), Reappraisal (β = .047, p = .600), and
Suppression (β =-.019, p = .829) were all nonsignificant in predicting average reaction
time at this step.
Average reaction time for reappraisal trials (step two). The omnibus
prediction at the first step was nonsignificant, R2 = .025, F(3, 135 ) = 1.141, p = .335.
OSPAN (β = -.079, p = .357), Handedness (β = .021, p = .804), and Biological Sex (β = .134, p = .118) were all nonsignificant in predicting average reaction time at this step.
The omnibus prediction at the second step was nonsignificant, DR2 = .041, F(6, 132) =
1.551, p = .166. Neuroticism (β = .186, p = .044) was significant in predicting average
reaction time at this step, while Reappraisal (β = .080, p = .360) and Suppression (β =
-.126, p = .148) were not.
Difference in average reaction time between step one and two in the
reappraisal trials. The omnibus prediction at the first step was nonsignificant, R2 = .018,
F(3, 135) = .821, p = .484. OSPAN (β = .029, p = .735), Handedness (β = -.100, p =
.256), and Biological Sex (β = -.091, p = .287) were all nonsignificant in predicting the
difference in average reaction time between steps one and two in the reappraisal trials at
this step of the regression. The omnibus prediction at the second step was nonsignificant,
DR2 = .042, F(6, 132) = 1.397, p = .220. Neuroticism (β = .138, p = .133) and Reappraisal
(β = .060, p = .495) were nonsignificant in predicting the difference in average reaction
time between steps one and two in the reappraisal trials at this step of the regression,
while Suppression (β = -.177, p = .043) significantly predicted this step in the regression.
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Mixed Effects Logistic Regressions
Two generalized linear mixed effects logistic regression analyses were conducted
to examine the effect of biological sex, item, target race, WMC, coping strategies, and
neuroticism on accuracy during each trial for the standard and reappraisal FPST.
Accuracy was coded 1 for a correct decision ("Shot the Shooter" or "Helped a civilian”)
while an incorrect decision was coded as 0. The fixed effect predictors were specified as
Item (Gun vs. Non-weapon) with the items that weren’t guns as the baseline (Nonweapon = 0), Target Race (Black vs. White) with White coded as the baseline (White =
0), Biological Sex (Male vs. Female) with Female as the baseline (Female = 0),
Suppression, Reappraisal, Neuroticism, and WMC. The random effect predictor was
Participant, which accounted for repeated measures per participant. One model was used
to predict Accuracy for the standard FPST, and another model was used to predict
Accuracy for the reappraisal FPST. In the reappraisal trials participants were considered
outliers if they did not respond at least 25% (40 trials) of the time. Based on this criterion
a total of 14 outliers were removed. The average accuracy rate for the standard trials was
.90 (SD = .08), and .55 (SD = .07) for Step 2 of the reappraisal trials. All data was
analyzed with R version 3.6.1.
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Table 2
Generalized Linear Mixed Effects Logistic Regression Predicting Accuracy for Standard Trials
Variable

B

SE

z

p

(Intercept)

1.284

0.889

1.445

.148

Item

1.345

0.760

1.771

.077

Race

-0.473

0.677

-0.699

.485

Reappraisal

0.012

0.019

0.611

.541

Suppression

-0.007

0.017

-0.415

.678

Neuroticism

0.007

0.016

0.443

.658

Sex

0.117

0.196

0.595

.552

OSPAN

0.009

0.006

1.404

.160

Item x Race

-0.455

1.026

-0.443

.658

Item x Reappraisal

-0.037*

0.018

-2.020

.043

Race x Reappraisal

0.026

0.017

1.548

.122

Item x Suppression

0.027

0.016

1.687

.092

Race x Suppression

-0.006

0.014

-0.438

.662

Item x Neuroticism

-0.012

0.014

-0.826

.409

Race x Neuroticism

0.002

0.013

0.121

.904

Item x Race x Reappraisal

-0.004

0.025

-0.156

.876

Item x Race x Suppression

0.007

0.022

-0.335

.738

0.020

1.139

.255

Item x Race x Neuroticism
0.022
Note. Race = Target Race; OSPAN is a measure of WMC.
*p < .05

Model predicting accuracy for standard trials. To address Hypotheses 1a and
1b, a model predicting Accuracy in the standard trials was created. As coping
(Reappraisal and Suppression) and Neuroticism are predictor variables in the model,
Hypotheses 6a and 6b are also addressed. The syntax for this model was: Accuracy ~
Item*Race* Emotional Reappraisal + Item*Race* Emotional Suppression + Item*Race*
Neuroticism + Biological Sex + OSPAN + (1 | Participant). The results of the regression
are shown in Table 2. The results of the mixed effects logistic regression model revealed
that an Item X Reappraisal interaction significantly predicted Accuracy (B = -0.037, p =
.043). This result demonstrates that when the item was a gun, the higher the Reappraisal
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score, the more likely the participant was to respond accurately. All other main effects
and interactions were nonsignificant. According to the significance of the Item X
Reappraisal interaction, Hypothesis 6a is supported when the item was a gun. However,
as all main effects and interactions including Neuroticism were not significant,
Hypothesis 6b is not supported. Furthermore, because of the non-significant Item X Race
interaction, these results do not support Hypothesis 1a in which it was predicted that
accuracy would be lower for Black targets holding non-weapons. Similarly, since the
main effect of Item was not significant, Hypothesis 1b is not supported.
Accuracy comparison between Step 1 and Step 2. To address Hypothesis 3, we
assessed the change in accuracy from Step 1 and Step 2 of the reappraisal phase by
computing the proportion of trials that participants were correct on Step 1 and Step 2 (no
change), the proportion of trials that participants were incorrect on both Step 1 and Step 2
(no change), the proportion of trials that participants were incorrect on Step 1 and then
were correct on Step 2 (improvement in performance), and the proportion of trials that
participants were correct on Step 1 and then were incorrect on Step 2 (decline in
performance). Additionally, we computed these values for overall performance and
separately for performance when the target stayed the same distance, came closer, or
moved farther away from Step 1 to Step 2. Table 3 shows these results. The results of a
repeated measures ANOVA for each of the four proportions predicting accuracy revealed
a significant effect, F(3, 375) = 893.316, p < .001. Follow-up tests demonstrated that
participants were more likely to change their response from correct to incorrect (M =
.335, SD = .093) than to change their response from incorrect to correct (M = .055, SD =
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.066). Regardless of distance type, participants changed from a correct to incorrect
response significantly more than they changed from an incorrect to a correct response,
suggesting that the behavioral intervention of giving participants a second chance to
evaluate their decision is not effective in improving shooting accuracy. Thus, Hypothesis
3, which predicted that participants would make more accurate decisions after situational
reappraisal (that incorrect-correct would be more likely to occur than correct-incorrect) is
not supported.
Moreover, we computed the proportion of trials that participants made the same
response (correct-correct and incorrect-incorrect) and made a different response (correctTable 3
Comparison of Accuracy between Step 1 and 2 of the Reappraisal Trials Overall and by Target Movement
Correct-Correct
Overall
Same
Farther
Closer

.560
.786
.475
.532

Incorrect-Incorrect
.049
.039
.045
.058

Correct-Incorrect

Incorrect-Correct

.335
.101
.418
.363

.055
.062
.052
.048

incorrect and incorrect-correct) in the reappraisal phase Step 2 compared to Step 1. We
next compared the proportion of ‘same response’ and ‘different response’ by target
movement: same distance in Step 2, closer distance in Step 2, and farther distance in Step
2. Three paired sample t-tests were conducted to compare the proportion of same
responses versus different responses by target distance. The results showed a significant
difference for all three target movement distances, ps < .05. The proportion of ‘same’
responses (correct-correct and incorrect-incorrect) responses was significantly higher
than the proportion of different responses (correct-incorrect and incorrect-correct) for all
three target distances (same, closer, and farther).
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In order to address Hypotheses 5a and 5b, a comparison of whether the proportion
of ‘same’ responses differed between target movement trials was made. For this analysis,
a repeated measures ANOVA was conducted with target movement (Same, Closer,
Farther) as the predictor and proportion of ‘same’ responses as the dependent variable. A
significant effect was observed, F(2, 248) = 239.088, p < .001, ƞ2p = .658. Participants
had a significantly greater proportion of ‘same’ responses in Step 1 and Step 2 on trials in
which the target moved closer (M = .590, SD = .094) compared to when it moved farther
away (M = .520, SD = .117). Thus, Hypothesis 5b is supported since participants would
be more likely to have the ‘same’ response when an armed target approached than when
the target retreated. However, participants made fewer ‘same’ responses on trials in
which the target moved closer (M = .590, SD = .094) compared to when the target stayed
the same distance (M = .8240, SD = .133). Participants also made fewer ‘same’
responses on trials in which the target moved farther away compared to trials that the
target stayed the same distance. Thus, Hypothesis 5a is supported since there were less
‘same’ responses on trials in which the target moved compared to trials in which it stayed
the same distance.
Additional analyses correlated individual differences in Neuroticism, Reappraisal
Scores, and Suppression Scores with (1) proportion of Correct – Correct responses, (2)
proportion of Incorrect-Incorrect responses, (3) proportion of Correct – Incorrect
responses, and (4) proportion of Incorrect – Correct responses. These analyses were
conducted to address Hypotheses 7a and 7b. No significant correlations were observed,
ps > .05. Thus, Hypotheses 7a and 7b are not supported.
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Model predicting accuracy for reappraisal (Step 2). In order to address
Hypotheses 4, 6a, and 6b, a model predicting Accuracy in Step 2 of the reappraisal trials
was created. The syntax for this model was: Step 2-Accuracy ~ Item*Race*Emotional
Reappraisal*Target Movement + Item*Race*Emotional Suppression*Target Movement
+ Item*Race*Neuroticism*Target Movement + Accuracy_Step1 + Biological Sex +
OSPAN + (1 | Participant). Target Movement was coded such that 0 was closer distance,
1 was same distance, and 2 was farther away. The results of the mixed effects logistic
regression model revealed that Target Movement-Farther significantly predicted
Accuracy (B = 1.048, p < .001). The three-way interaction Item X Reappraisal X Target
Movement-Farther significantly predicted Accuracy (B = -0.010, p = .001); when the
item was a gun and the target moved farther away, higher Reappraisal scores predicted
higher shooting accuracy. The three-way interaction Race X Reappraisal X Target
Movement-Farther significantly predicted Accuracy (B = 0.006, p = .029); when the
target was White and the target moved farther away, individuals with higher Reappraisal
scores were more likely to respond accurately. The results are represented in Table 4. The
significant main effect of Target Movement-Farther supports Hypothesis 4, as
participants were more accurate when the target moved farther away in comparison to
when the target moved closer. The significance of the three-way interactions of Item X
Reappraisal X Target Movement-Farther and Race X Reappraisal X Target MovementFarther lend support to Hypothesis 6a. However, as all main effects and interactions
including Neuroticism were not significant, Hypothesis 6b is not supported.
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Table 4
Generalized Linear Mixed Effects Logistic Regression Predicting Accuracy for Step Two in Reappraisal
Trials
Variable

B

(Intercept)
Item
Race
Reappraisal
Target Movement-Farther
Target Movement-Same
Suppression
Neuroticism
Step1 Accuracy
Sex
OSPAN
Item x Race
Item x Reappraisal

-0.085
1.062**
0.030
0.001
1.048**
0.949**
0.001
0.001
-0.003
0.004
0.001
0.000
-0.002
-0.001
-0.820**
-0.178
-0.254
-0.003
0.000
0.000
-0.001
0.000
-0.005*
-0.002
0.000
-0.002
-0.002
0.000
0.085
-0.108
-0.010**
-0.006
0.006*
0.003
-0.001
-0.003

Race x Reappraisal
Item x Target Movement-Same
Race x Target Movement-Farther
Race x Target Movement-Same
Reappraisal x Target Movement-Farther
Reappraisal x Target Movement-Same
Item x Suppression
Race x Suppression
Target Movement-Farther x Suppression
Target Movement-Same x Suppression
Item x Neuroticism
Race x Neuroticism
Target Movement-Farther x Neuroticism
Target Movement-Same x Neuroticism
Item x Race x Reappraisal
Item x Race x Target Movement-Farther
Item x Race x Target Movement-Same
Item x Reappraisal x Target Movement-Farther
Item x Reappraisal x Target Movement-Same
Race x Reappraisal x Target Movement-Farther
Race x Reappraisal x Target Movement-Same
Item x Race x Suppression
Item x Target Movement-Farther x Suppression
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SE
0.082
0.091
0.089
0.002
0.089
0.114
0.002
0.001
0.005
0.016
0.000
0.128
0.002
0.002
0.156
0.127
0.159
0.002
0.003
0.002
0.002
0.002
0.002
0.002
0.002
0.002
0.002
0.003
0.181
0.223
0.003
0.004
0.003
0.004
0.003
0.003

t
-1.035
11.631
0.337
0.354
11.713
8.320
0.313
0.641
-0.566
0.284
1.560
0.002
-0.750
-0.294
-5.254
-1.399
-1.592
-1.332
0.164
-0.143
-0.484
-0.253
-2.002
-1.035
0.150
-0.980
-1.073
-0.051
0.469
-0.483
-3.407
-1.517
2.183
0.687
-0.196
-0.984

p(z)
.301
.000
.736
.723
.000
.000
.754
.521
.571
.776
.119
.998
.453
.769
.000
.162
.111
.183
.870
.887
.628
.800
.045
.301
.881
.327
.283
.960
.639
.629
.001
.129
.029
.492
.845
.325

Item x Target Movement-Same x Suppression
Race x Target Movement-Farther x Suppression
Race x Target Movement-Same x Suppression
Item x Race x Neuroticism
Item x Target Movement-Farther x Neuroticism
Item x Target Movement-Same x Neuroticism
Race x Target Movement-Farther x Neuroticism
Race x Target Movement-Same x Neuroticism
Item x Race x Reappraisal x Target Movement-Farther
Item x Race x Reappraisal x Target Movement-Same
Item x Race x Target Movement-Farther x Suppression
Item x Race x Target Movement-Same x Suppression
Item x Race x Target Movement-Farther x Neuroticism
Item x Race x Target Movement-Same x Neuroticism
Note. Race = Target Race; OSPAN is a measure of WMC.
*p < .05
**p<.01

0.004
0.000
0.004
0.000
0.003
0.000
-0.001
0.004
-0.004
0.007
0.001
-0.004
0.000
-0.001

0.003
0.003
0.003
0.002
0.002
0.003
0.002
0.003
0.004
0.005
0.004
0.005
0.003
0.004

1.229
0.072
1.335
0.117
1.357
-0.113
-0.320
1.307
-0.843
1.269
0.319
-0.763
-0.037
-0.153

.219
.943
.182
.907
.175
.910
.749
.191
.399
.204
.750
.446
.971
.879

Mixed Effects Linear Regressions
Three mixed effects linear regression analyses were conducted to examine the
effect of biological sex, item, target race, WMC, coping strategies, and neuroticism on
reaction time during each trial for the standard and reappraisal FPST. One model was
used to predict Reaction Time during the standard trials, while two others were used to
predict Reaction Time during the reappraisal trials (one for each step). Outliers that were
more than 2.5 standard deviations above or below the mean Reaction Time were
removed. Three outliers for Reaction Time were removed for the standard trials. The
average reaction time for the standard trials was .67 (SD = .15), .75 (SD = .178) for Step
1 of the reappraisal trials, and .63 (SD = .34) for Step 2 of the reappraisal trials.
Model predicting reaction time for standard trials. To address Hypotheses 2a
and 2b, a mixed effects linear regression model predicting Reaction Time in the standard
trials was created. The syntax for the model was: RT ~ Item*Race* Emotional
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Reappraisal + Item*Race* Emotional Suppression + Item*Race* Neuroticism +
Biological Sex + OSPAN + (1 + Item*Race | Participant). The results for the regression
are shown in Table 5. The results of the mixed effects linear regression model revealed
that Item significantly predicted Reaction Time (B = -0.090, p = 0.003) as did the Item x
Suppression interaction (B = 0.002, p = 0.012). The Item x Race x Suppression
interaction was marginal in predicting Reaction Time (B = -0.001, p = 0.053). All other
main effects and interactions were nonsignificant. Because of the significant main effect
of Item, Hypothesis 2a is supported; participants were faster when shooting an armed
target compared to an unarmed target (a target with a non-weapon). However, the Item X
Race interaction was non-significant, thus there is no evidence to support Hypothesis 2b,
in which it was predicted that participants would be faster to shoot a Black armed target.
Table 5
Generalized Linear Mixed Effects Regression Predicting Reaction Time for Standard Trials
Variable

B

SE

t

p(z)

(Intercept)

0.732

0.068

10.750

.000

Item

-0.090**

0.030

-2.963

.003

Race

-0.016

0.027

-0.603

.547

Reappraisal

0.000

0.001

0.207

.836

Suppression

-0.001

0.001

-0.680

.496

Neuroticism

0.000

0.001

0.322

.747

Sex

-0.016

0.017

-0.897

.370

OSPAN

0.000

0.001

-0.840

.401

Item x Race

0.018

0.038

0.467

.640

Item x Reappraisal

0.000

0.001

0.070

.944

Race x Reappraisal

0.000

0.001

-0.180

.857

Item x Suppression

0.002*

0.001

2.526

.012

Race x Suppression

0.001

0.001

0.983

.325

Item x Neuroticism

0.000

0.001

0.089

.929

Race x Neuroticism

0.001

0.001

0.983

.326

Item x Race x Reappraisal

0.000

0.001

0.457

.648
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Item x Race x Suppression

-0.001

Item x Race x Neuroticism
0.000
Note. Race = Target Race; OSPAN is a measure of WMC.
*p < .05
**p<.01

0.001

-1.934

.053

0.001

-0.359

.720

Model predicting reaction time for reappraisal trials (Step 1). A mixed effects
linear regression model predicting Reaction Time in the first step of the reappraisal trials
was created. The syntax for the model was: RT ~ Item*Race* Emotional Reappraisal +
Item*Race* Emotional Suppression + Item*Race* Neuroticism + Biological Sex +
OSPAN + (1 | Participant). The results for the regression are shown in Table 6. All main
effects and interactions were nonsignificant.
Table 6
Generalized Linear Mixed Effects Regression Predicting Reaction Time for First Step of Reappraisal Trials
Variable

B

SE

t

p(z)

(Intercept)

0.735

0.091

8.044

.000

Item

-0.055

0.04

-1.361

.173

Race

-0.051

0.035

-1.478

.14

Reappraisal

0.001

0.002

0.561

.575

Suppression

-0.001

0.002

-0.328

.743

Neuroticism
Sex
OSPAN
Item x Race

0.002

0.002

1.105

.269

-0.012

0.022

-0.559

.576

0

0.001

-0.479

.632

0.055

0.049

1.135

.256

Item x Reappraisal

-0.001

0.001

-0.869

.385

Race x Reappraisal

0.001

0.001

1.187

.235

Item x Suppression

0

0.001

-0.117

.906

Race x Suppression

0.001

0.001

0.761

.447

Item x Neuroticism

0

0.001

0.555

.579

Race x Neuroticism

0

0.001

0.638

.523

Item x Race x Reappraisal

-0.001

0.001

-0.703

.482

Item x Race x Suppression

-0.001

0.001

-0.597

.551

0.001

-0.819

.413

Item x Race x Neuroticism
-0.001
Note. Race = Target Race; OSPAN is a measure of WMC.
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Model predicting reaction time for reappraisal trials (Step 2). A mixed effects
linear regression model predicting Reaction Time in the second step of the reappraisal
trials was created. The syntax for the model was: RT ~ Item*Race* Emotional
Reappraisal + Item*Race* Emotional Suppression + Item*Race* Neuroticism +
Biological Sex + OSPAN + (1 | Participant). The results of the regression are shown in
Table 7. Item significantly predicted Reaction Time (B = -0.121, p = 0.007) while all
other main effects and interactions were nonsignificant.
Table 7
Generalized Linear Mixed Effects Regression Predicting Reaction Time for Second Step of Reappraisal
Trials
Variable

B

(Intercept)

0.634

SE

t

p(z)

0.1

6.311

.000

Item

-0.121**

0.044

-2.717

.007

Race

-0.051

0.046

-1.101

.271

Reappraisal

-0.001

0.002

-0.387

.699

Suppression

-0.001

0.002

-0.659

.51

Neuroticism

0.002

0.002

1.091

.275

Sex

-0.027

0.023

-1.158

.247

OSPAN

0.000

0.001

0.31

.757

Item x Race

0.072

0.062

1.164

.244

Item x Reappraisal

0.002

0.001

1.786

.074

Race x Reappraisal

0.002

0.001

1.441

.15

Item x Suppression

0.000

0.001

-0.387

.699

Race x Suppression

-0.001

0.001

-0.787

.431

Item x Neuroticism

0.001

0.001

1.582

.114

Race x Neuroticism

0.000

0.001

0.393

.694

Item x Race x Reappraisal

-0.002

0.001

-1.374

.169

Item x Race x Suppression

0.001

0.001

0.841

.400

0.001

-0.608

.543

Item x Race x Neuroticism
-0.001
Note. Race = Target Race; OSPAN is a measure of WMC.
*p < .05
**p<.01
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Supplemental Analyses Comparing Hits, Misses, Correct Rejections, and
False Alarms
SDT states that when an individual is making a decision, he or she is faced with
both a signal (or target stimulus) and background noise (Green & Swets, 1966). SDT can
be applied when individuals need to make decisions that compare the presence or absence
of a target. Participants can respond with a hit in which the target is present and a
decision or response is made, a miss in which the target is present and a response is
absent, a false alarm in which the target is absent but a response is made, and a correct
rejection in which the target and response are both absent. A sensitivity index of
discriminating between the target signal and noise can be assessed by computing d’,
which represents the z-scored proportion of hits minus the z-scored proportion of false
alarms: d’ = z(H) – z(F) where H = hits and F = false alarms. Higher d’ values indicate
that a participant is more sensitive in discriminating between when the target signal is
present and when it is absent, and hit rates are greater than false alarm rates.

Hit

Shot shooter

False Alarm

Shot Civilian

Miss

Got Shot

Correct
Rejection

Hit

Miss

Shot Shooter
Shot Ambusher

Got Shot
Got Ambushed

False Alarm

Correct
Rejection

Shot Civilian

Helped Civilian

Figure 3A. SDT and decisions for
standard trials and step 1 of reappraisal
trials.

Helped Civilian
Did Not Shoot Ally

Figure 3B. SDT and decisions for step
2 of reappraisal trials.
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We examined the proportion of hits, misses, false alarms, correct rejections, and
d’ prime in the standard phase and Step 1 of the reappraisal phase. Because performance
in Step 2 of the reappraisal phase changed depending on whether the target moved or
stayed in the same position, the proportion in Step 2 has a different meaning than it does
in Step 1; thus, we did not examine these rates in Step 2 (see Figure 3).
To examine hits, misses, false alarms, correct rejections, and d’ between the
standard and reappraisal phase, paired samples t-tests were conducted for each of these
variables. Results indicated that rates of correct rejection were higher in the standard
phase (M = .452, SD = .062) than in the reappraisal phase (M = .431, SD = .082), t(125) =
2.166, p = .032. False alarm rates were also higher in the standard phase (M = .0457, SD
= .044) than in the reappraisal phase (M = .024, SD = .044), t(125) = 3.979, p < .001.
Additionally, the d’ sensitivity index was higher in the standard phase (M = .216, SD =
1.348) than in the reappraisal phase (M = .117, SD = 1.831), t(125) = 2.211, p = .029.
There were no significant differences in hits (p = .401) or misses (p = .680) individually
between conditions, however.
Correlations between the predictors and SDT outcome measures were also
conducted. There was no significant correlation between the individual difference
variables (Neuroticism, Suppression, and Reappraisal) and hits, misses, false alarms,
correct rejections, or d’ prime in the standard phase or in the reappraisal phase, ps > .15.

DISCUSSION
The purpose of this study was to investigate the influence of individual
differences in neuroticism and coping strategies on action-based decision-making. This
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objective was examined using a shooting simulation task in which participants had to
decide whether or not a target was innocuous; threatening targets were to be shot while
innocuous targets were to be helped. It was predicted that in the standard phase,
individuals would be less accurate in shooting a target than in phase two of the
reappraisal trials, and Black targets would be more likely to be treated as a threat. In the
second phase, it was anticipated that an unarmed target that moved closer would be more
likely to be shot, an unarmed target that moved farther away would be less likely to be
shot, and a target moving during reappraisal trials would lead to a different decision for
the second step of the trial except in the case of a target with a weapon moving closer,
which would lead to the same response. Additionally, it was predicted that individuals
that are higher in emotion reappraisal would have more accurate responses, and those
high in neuroticism would make less accurate responses.
Based on the findings, the hypotheses (Hypotheses 1a and 2b) that accuracy
would be lower for Black targets holding non-weapon items than White targets, and
participants would shoot an armed target faster if he was Black were not supported. Thus,
there was no evidence that target race alone is a factor in the accuracy of a shooting
decision in our sample. In addition to the race of the target, item type was examined as a
predictor of performance. As predicted, when the item was a gun, participants reacted
faster (Hypothesis 2a) in standard trials and the second step of the reappraisal trials.
However, in the standard trials, participants were not more likely to shoot when the target
was holding a gun, not lending support to our hypothesis (Hypothesis 1b).
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In addition to the effect of perceivable aspects of the stimuli (i.e., race and item
type) on performance, individual differences in personality and coping strategies were
explored as a potential influence on decision to shoot. Participants that had strong
reappraisal coping skills made more accurate shooting decisions (Hypothesis 6a) when
the item was a gun in the standard trials. However, participants reacted slower to an
armed target if they scored high in Suppression, indicative of poorer coping strategy, in
standard trials. In contrast to the influence of coping style, the personality trait
neuroticism did not predict accuracy in shooting decision, contrary to what was predicted
(Hypothesis 6b). These results suggest that coping style, but not personality-based coping
tendencies, has a significant influence on shooting decisions. In addition to accuracy and
reaction time, the impact of individual differences on the decision to make the same or
different response after reappraisal was examined. The predictions that scoring high in
Reappraisal would be associated with a tendency to keep responses the same (Hypothesis
7a) and scoring high in neuroticism would be associated with making different responses
during the reappraisal period (Hypothesis 7b) were not supported.
In addition to the influence of individual differences, the impact of the
opportunity for reappraisal on decision was examined. The hypothesis that participants
would be more accurate in shooting decisions after reappraisal was not supported
(Hypothesis 3). Instead, participants were more likely to make an incorrect decision after
reappraisal. An additional aspect explored in the reappraisal trials was the effect of target
movement on response. It was demonstrated that participants were less accurate in their
response when the target came closer. Participants were more accurate in responding
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when the target moved farther away (Hypothesis 4), but only if they scored high in
Reappraisal and the item was a gun or the target was White. Overall, as predicted, having
the opportunity to reappraise the situation resulted in a change in decision if the target
moved closer or farther away as compared to the target staying the same distance
(Hypothesis 5a). The prediction that participants will be more likely to have the same
response during reappraisal when a target holding a weapon moves closer (Hypothesis
5b) was supported as there was a greater proportion of ‘same’ responses when the target
moved closer than when the target moved farther away.
Based on this research, it can be concluded that while reappraisal as an
opportunity or situational intervention does not lead to more accurate decisions, high
‘self’ reappraisal as a general coping mechanism does make an accurate decision more
likely. Once an individual is in a threatening situation, having an opportunity to
reappraise one’s decision as the target moves does not improve decision accuracy,
perhaps because the threat-related stress response has already begun. It is possible that
once a negative physiological response was initiated in the first step of the task, it could
not be overcome by simply providing time to re-evaluate the situation.
However, it appears that individuals who already utilize reappraisal as a coping
strategy may approach a threatening situation like the shooting scenario in this study with
an effective mindset. In contrast, a person that engages in suppression as a coping
strategy is more likely to approach such a situation in a threatened mindset. These
findings are consistent with prior work showing that situational and self-focused
reappraisal can exert distinctive effects on cognitive performance and emotional reactions
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(Willroth & Hilmire, 2016). Operationally, situational reappraisal entails reinterpreting an
emotionally charged stimulus or situation, while self-focused reappraisal refers to
differences in emotional perspective taking that a person approaches a situation with
(Webb, Miles, & Sheeran, 2012). Furthermore, self- and situational reappraisal rely on
distinctive brain regions; self-focused reappraisal relies on medial prefrontal brain
regions that play a role in internal information processing, and situation-focused
reappraisal relies on lateral prefrontal brain regions that play more of a role in external
information processing (Ochsner et al., 2004). The findings of the present study extend
this work on the distinction between self- and situational reappraisal to the domain of
shooting performance. Collectively, these findings suggest that the individual has a fair
amount of control over the coping strategy that influences performance accuracy in a
high-threat situation.
Overall, it appears that the mindset a person is in before they approach a
potentially threatening situation, such as a shooting scenario, has a greater impact on
decision accuracy than trait coping or giving a person an opportunity to re-evaluate the
situation. The implication of mindset being a determinant of accurate performance is that
individuals that face potentially threatening situations regularly can be trained to use
effective coping mechanisms. Since the opportunity for re-evaluation does not improve
decision accuracy, the amount of time someone has to analyze a situation is not what
significantly matters. Instead, it is important to make sure that individuals entering highthreat or other high-stakes situations regularly reappraise situations so that they can
approach the situations they are exposed to with an adaptive mindset.

43

In addition to coping strategy, race of the target and the presence of a gun
influence decision accuracy. This perceptive influence means that it is important to know
what individuals in dangerous situations consider threatening. By understanding what is
considered most threatening, efforts can be made in training (and perhaps in instituting
change at a societal level) to challenge any perceived threats that are prejudicial biases
(e.g. race). Another related perceptive influence is whether a change in the behavior of a
stimulus affects decision-making. This research demonstrates that having a target move is
associated with a change from an original decision. Once the stimulus is perceived as
being different from how it was originally perceived, the threat level of the stimulus can
also change. Thus, if an individual is faced with a stimulus it can go from being a threat
to a non-threat and vice versa depending on the stimulus’ behavior. The lack of
predictability of a stimulus further demonstrates the importance of facing a situation with
an adaptive mindset.
The issues relating to perception regarding the nature of a stimulus, such as that of
race and the presence of a weapon, are influenced by emotion. Based on the affect-asinformation hypothesis, the emotion invoked by a stimulus can convey motivating
information about the situation the perceiver is faced with (Schwarz & Clore, 1983). For
instance, the presence of a gun can invoke negative, high arousal emotion such as fear
causing the perceiver to be threatened and thus be motivated to defend himself or herself.
Our finding that participants were not more likely to shoot an armed target contradicts
this hypothesis. However, when coping strategy is added as a factor, having higher
coping skills was associated with being more likely to shoot an armed target. As a further
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highlight of the influence emotion has on perception, according to the threat-signal
hypothesis, a stimulus that is deemed threatening can be perceived as being closer than if
it was considered a non-threat (Cole et al., 2013); additionally, a threatening stimulus can
be perceived as moving faster (Witt & Sugovic, 2013). In line with this previous
research, our finding that participants reacted faster when the target was armed suggests
armed targets may have been perceived as moving faster. Our results also lend support
for the threat-signal hypothesis since participants were more likely to respond correctly to
targets that came closer compared to targets that moved farther away. In addition to the
presence of a weapon, race was also predicted to have an influence on threat perception.
In contrast to previous findings regarding shooter bias (Correll et al., 2002), Black targets
overall were not shot more often or faster than White targets. However, our finding that
high Reappraisal was associated with better accuracy in the decision to shoot only
applied to situations in which the target was White and the target moved farther away.
Reappraisal did not lead to better accuracy when the target was Black. The implication
for these results suggests that coping strategies alone are not the ideal solution for
preventing the misperception of threat, addressing racial bias is also important.
The results of the present study also relate to the risk-as-feelings hypothesis,
which proposes that both emotion and risk evaluation can be used to make a decision
(Loewenstein et al., 2001). In particular, the mindset someone has coming into an
emotionally charged, risky situation can impact the decision made. The finding that
participants were only more accurate when the target was armed if they scored high in
Reappraisal demonstrates the importance of mindset. Thus, coping through self-
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reappraisal is an important factor in making an accurate decision. The shooting decision
made can be framed in terms of whether or not the participant successfully engaged
response inhibition (i.e. inhibited a conditioned fear response). Despite the influence of
emotion, threat-related physiological arousal tends to have a stronger influence on
response inhibition than the valence of the threat (Pessoa et al., 2012). Thus, if an
individual is able to adaptively regulate his or her physiological response so as to
experience less arousal, the individual may have more control over his or her conditioned
response to the threat. This conclusion is supported by the finding that scoring high in
Reappraisal had some influence on being more likely to respond accurately. Based on this
finding, it is possible that when faced with a threatening situation, using reappraisal as a
coping strategy may lead to a decrease in arousal, allowing the individual to overcome
the impulse to use a fear-based response such as shooting.
Previous work shows that evaluation of a stimulus determines whether an
individual will approach or avoid the stimulus (Elliot & Covington, 2001). In our results,
participants with strong coping skills were less likely to approach (i.e. shoot) a target that
moved farther away during the reappraisal trials when the target was White. This finding
suggests that the presence of a White individual and movement away from the individual
can cause a less negative evaluation of the situation. Overall, these results demonstrate
that characteristics of a stimulus can influence whether it is deemed threatening and, in
turn, the action an individual will take towards the stimulus.
According to protection motivation theory, an individual will be motivated to
defend himself or herself when faced with a stimulus assessed as a threat (Floyd et al.,
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2000). This theory was not supported (when Item alone was considered) as our results
demonstrate that armed targets were not more likely to be assessed as a threat. Just as the
ability to protect oneself is important, so is the ability to cope in an ambiguously
threatening situation. It is theorized that effective coping will lead to more positive
emotion (Smith & Lazarus, 1990). This concept was supported by our results as
individuals with strong self-reappraisal coping skills were more accurate in their response
when the target was White or the item was a gun and the target moved away; when faced
with a threatening task, such individuals were able to react with an adaptive response as
they may have believed they could cope with the situation effectively.
In addition to individual differences in coping strategy, this study examined the
influence of other individual difference factors, including neuroticism and WMC, on
shooting performance. Since there is a link between neuroticism and negative coping
(Hengartner et al., 2017) it was predicted that individuals higher in neuroticism would
perform more poorly. However, our findings were not consistent with this prediction;
neuroticism had no significant effect on shooting decision. Thus, unlike self-reappraisal,
trait neuroticism does not influence shooting behavior. Another cognitive trait, WMC,
was also predicted to have an influence on shooting performance as previous research has
demonstrated that individuals with lower WMC are less accurate in shooting decisions
(Brewer et al., 2016; Kleider & Parrott, 2009; Kleider et al., 2010); our findings showed
no significant relationship between WMC and shooting behavior. In addition to
psychological characteristics, we examined the physical characteristic of biological sex as
a potential influence on shooting performance; previous research demonstrated that males
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are more likely to be involved in shootings (Donner et al., 2017). However, there was no
significant relationship between biological sex and shooting performance in our findings.
Overall, from the lack of support of our predictions, we can conclude that ingrained
individual differences are not as significant contributors to action-based decisions as
more mutable characteristics such as self-reappraisal. The implication of these findings is
that performance in high-stakes situations, including those involving shooting decisions,
could potentially be improved through training in self-reappraisal coping skills.

Limitations
There are limitations in this study concerning demographics. It is possible that the
participant’s race might have an influence on whether or not a particular target is shot.
For instance, a Black participant may be less likely to shoot a Black target than a White
participant would. This possibility may be due to identifying the target as a member of an
ingroup versus outgroup. If a participant uses System 1 cognition when determining the
threat level of the target, the decision will be made automatically and be based on past
experiences with or held stereotypes of individuals that are the same race as the target. In
contrast, if the participant uses System 2 cognition then slower processing involving
reasoning will be used in making the decision (Tay, Ryan, & Ryan, 2016). In the
situation presented by the task (trying to make a decision in a short period of time), it is
easier to rely on System 1 rather than System 2 processing. Thus, participants may be
more likely to use the associations they have with particular races and whether they and
the target are the same race to decide whether the target is a threat. In the current study it
is possible that there was some bias against shooting White targets because 80% of the
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participants were White. However, it is possible that participant race has no significant
influence on perceived threat based on target race, as it has been demonstrated that
participant ethnicity has no significant influence on whether a participant exhibits shooter
bias (Correll et al., 2002).
Another limitation relating to demographics is convenience sampling and the
number of females. Participants were university students and overwhelmingly female
(79%). Having such a skewed sample in terms of biological sex may have impacted the
results. Particularly, we may not have detected a significant effect of biological sex
predicting performance, with males performing worse than females, because we did not
have enough males. Thus, there are limitations to generalizing our findings to the broader
population.

Future Directions
Future research can take a different approach to the statistical analyses.
Performance in Step 2 of the reappraisal trials varied as a function of whether the target
stayed in the same position or moved; thus d’ would not mean the same in Step 2 as it
does in Step 1. In order to compare d’ between Step 1 and Step 2 in the reappraisal trials,
accuracy rates in Step 2 would need to be transformed. Another statistical change that can
be incorporated involves the variable Neuroticism. Since the models that included
Neuroticism were not significant, future research can examine reduced models without
Neuroticism. Outside of statistical implications, it is possible that measuring amygdala
activity or using some other measure of emotional reactivity like heart rate variability,
rather than using Neuroticism, may have yielded positive results. Such measures may be
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more sensitive to emotional reactivity to threat, which we were trying to operationalize in
our study. Thus, future research could use more sensitive measures for emotional
reactivity.
Another new approach for future research is looking at core self-evaluation (CSE)
as a variable. CSE is an assessment that individuals make about themselves that consists
of assessing their capabilities, competence, and positive outlook on life. It is a concept
that combines the traits of self-esteem, self-efficacy, locus of control, and low
neuroticism. Research has shown that these four traits are moderately related to each
other and that they load on a common factor. Additionally, there is evidence that CSE
predicts outcomes such as stress better than the four traits individually (Judge, 2009). It is
possible that being high in CSE will be associated with making less errors in high-stakes,
threatening situations. Another way individual differences can be further explored in the
future is in observing whether there are any interactions between WMC, Neuroticism (or
CSE), and coping strategies (Reappraisal and Suppression). Since both WMC and
emotion have an influence on behavior, it would be beneficial to investigate their
combined effects.
Future research could also further explore the issue of race in shooting decisions
by using eye tracking to compare where participants look when the target is Black versus
when the target is White. Another perception issue is how variation in the presentation of
the targets and backgrounds could alter the ability to detect a weapon. A source of
variation was the various types of non-weapons that could appear in a target’s hand.
Although there’s no previous research about the differences in difficulty of distinguishing
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different types of objects from guns, future research can explore whether certain items are
perceived as more similar in appearance to guns, especially under time pressure.
Additionally, there are 20 different backgrounds, a few of which are presented behind a
target in a single trial. Although these backgrounds are designed to make the task more
realistic, due to differences in contrast between the different backgrounds and items, the
difficulty of determining whether a particular item is a weapon could potentially vary as a
function of the background presented at the end of the trial. Other potential influences on
object detection are posture of the target and clothing. In addition to the potential issue of
object detection is the possibility of participants being more likely to perceive an object
as a weapon due to a higher sense of threat associated with certain backgrounds and
clothing. Thus, usability and perceptual studies should be conducted on this task to
determine the effect of different backgrounds, target position, object type, and clothing
on performance.

CONCLUSION
Situational factors and individual differences are important factors to consider in
action-based decision-making contexts, such as shooting a target. Regarding situational
factors, the results of this study show that the presence of a gun does not predict shooting
accuracy. Thus, further research about weapon detection should be conducted to better
understand how the presence or absence of a weapon influences shooting decision
accuracy. Furthermore, this study did not find evidence that race significantly predicts
shooting accuracy –except if the target is White and moves away– which does not
support the concept of shooter bias. Thus, the relationship between race and shooting
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decision should be investigated further to determine if there are any contributing factors
besides race in the shooter bias phenomenon. Furthermore, individual differences in
biological sex, WMC, and neuroticism did not predict shooting performance in this study.
Given that prior research has found associations between WMC and biological sex on
shooting behavior, further research should be conducted to elucidate the nuances of these
relationships.
In this study, reappraisal was examined as both a situational (situational
reappraisal) and individual difference (self-reappraisal) factor in action-based decisionmaking. Regarding the former, in high-stakes, high-threat situations in which decisions
must be made quickly, it may seem that having a second chance to evaluate a decision
would increase the likelihood of making a correct decision. However, having a situational
reappraisal period did not lead to more accurate action-based decision-making in the
present study. Individual differences in coping style on the other hand, have a significant
influence on decision accuracy. Specifically, high self-reappraisal coping strategies are
associated with more accurate action-based decision-making in simulated shooting
scenarios. Overall, a promising way to increase the chances of an accurate action-based
decision in a high-stakes situation is to ensure that the individual making the decision has
very strong coping skills.
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APPENDIX A: Standard FPST Instructions
Standard FPST Practice Trials Instructions
In this experiment, your task is to shoot any person holding a gun by pressing the L key.
If a person is holding something other than a gun, you should press the A key to help
him.
You will have less than a second to make each decision.
You will receive points based on your performance. At the end
of the task, you will receive 1 dollar for every 100 points you earn.
We will start with a few practice trials.
PRESS SPACE TO CONTINUE
Standard Trials Instructions
You have finished the practice phase.
The test phase of the experiment is longer.
Please try to stay focused throughout the task.
Doing so will allow us to more accurately
gauge your performance.
Reminder: press L to shoot and A to help.
Please tell the experimenter if you have any questions.
PRESS THE SPACE BAR TO CONTINUE.
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APPENDIX B: Reappraisal FPST Instructions
THE TASK HAS CHANGED!
PLEASE READ THESE INSTRUCTIONS CAREFULLY!
In this next part of the experiment, you will see two phases. The first phase is the
same as you have done--shoot the guys who have a gun and help the guys who don’t
have a gun.
In the second phase, however, the guy you just shot or helped will appear again. So,
you will see the same guy again immediately after your first action. If that guy gets
closer, you must shoot him. If the guy gets farther away the second time you see
him, you must help him. If the guy stays the same distance, shoot him if he has a gun
(press L) and help him if he does not have a gun (press A).
You will not be given feedback for your first response; you only receive feedback
based on your performance in the second phase, when the guy gets closer, farther
away, or stays the same distance.
Please take some time to make sure you understand these instructions. Ask the
experimenter if you have any questions.
PRESS THE SPACE BAR TO CONTINUE.
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